Rattlesnake Fire

This fire from 1953 was forgotten for many years. However, in the 1990s the Mendocino Hotshot Crew began to curate the site and eventually developed it into first-class memorial and a formal staff ride.  The fire resulted in the 15 firefighter fatalities and is a classic example of the tenuous ways in which wildland fires were staffed in the early part of the 20th century.

This 4th annual Old Men and Fire event began with all gathering in Chico, California on April 23, 2025 at an AirBnB with a group meal of Costco lasagna...in attendance were Tom Boatner, Dan Buckley, Jim Cook, Chad Fisher, Kurt La Rue, Bill Molumby, and Bryan Scholz. The next day everyone linked up for Starbucks in Willows with our host and recent OM&F recruit, Don Will; who would walk us through the events of the fire.  The group convoyed across the valley, through Stonyford, to the Forest boundary, and eventually up to Grindstone Canyon overlook; following and discussing the events of 1953.  At different times during the day the group was joined by three local long-time Hotshot Superintendents Tom Hatcher (Plumas), Jon Tishner (Mendocino), and Daren Dalrymple (Mendocino). The day ended with the traditional post-visit integration BBQ dinner with a few guests. Some presentations were made and young Chad Fisher was inducted into the group for succession planning purposes.

As an added bonus for this trip, over the next two days, several of the group participated in the annual Tahoe Hotshot Half Marathon at New Bullards Bar Reservoir. 

Individual Takeaways:

Tom Boatner, former Smokejumper Base Manager and Bureau of Land Management Chief of Fire Operations –  Our visit to the Rattlesnake Fire reconfirmed for me the importance of studying historical fires and reflecting on the actions of the fireline leaders and firefighters who fought them. We are all students of leadership and students for life. Part of that commitment is a healthy curiosity about our shared occupation. What was the firefighting experience like before our time? Who were the people who did the work before us? How do we fit into this historical story of fires and firefighters? What legacy do we leave for those who follow us? What have we forgotten and what do we still remember? 

   Strong, healthy organizations and their leaders honor and respect those who came before them, remember their collective past, and strive to learn and practice important lessons from the past. The Rattlesnake Fire and the Mission Boys were an almost forgotten part of our shared legacy, but Don Will, Jon Tishner, Daren Dalrymple refused to forget. They helped preserve an important part of our history, a place where we can reflect, learn, and honor those who preceded us on the fireline.

    
Dan Buckley, former Hotshot Superintendent and National Park Service Fire Director –  There was a lot to learn from this study and visit to the Rattlesnake fatality site. What impressed me the most was the lesson of how LCES is so important, even when the fire is behaving nicely and things look well in-hand. After working a long shift and containing a spot fire out in the green, 24 people sat down to take a break and grab a bite to eat. There were no lookouts and radio communication in those days was almost non-existent. As the firefighters were taking a well-deserved break on an isolated section of the fire, the winds picked up and breathed new life into the Rattlesnake Fire. With no lookout and no ability to warn them of their peril in a timely manner, the New Tribes Mission Fire Crew and their Forest Service overhead had very little time to react, find escape routes and make it to a safety zone. Only nine of the 24 made it out alive. The nine made it because they responded quickly to an urgent vocal exhortation to leave their location now. The other 15 did not react as quickly and the escape route used by the nine was unavailable to them. The 15 found themselves in a race with a head fire on steep, brushy slopes. It was a race that couldn't be won.  

   This emphasizes a point I was trying to make in the latter years in my career as a wildland firefighter. If there might be a need to evacuate people, better to call for the evacuation early rather than later.  If the early evacuation turns out not to be needed, well, it is an inconvenience. If the evacuation is needed and the call to do so comes too late, it has high potential to result in a tragedy.  

 
Jim Cook, former Hotshot Superintendent and US Forest Service Training Projects Coordinator –  Every major tragedy fire in our history seems to generate multiple conspiracy theories, and this fire was no different. There were accusations of experienced firefighters turning down the assignment and the lesser experienced New Tribes Mission Crew being sent in their place; there was speculation on a variety of fire behavior causes; the experience level of the crew leaders was questioned…and more. What I found interesting was that the US Forest Service actually issued a short document titled "Fact vs. Myth - Rattlesnake Fire" as part of the investigation. The document addressed numerous grapevine rumors and certainly some of the agency responses were very defensive. However, nature abhors a vacuum and the investigation team recognized this, addressing the rumors head on. Perhaps a practice that could be re-instituted today.

Chad Fisher, former Hotshot, Smokejumper, and National Park Service Fire Director - I’ve been known to say, “Fires are easy; the people are hard.” What I mean is a fire doesn’t think. It is simply going to do what is dictated by fuels, weather, and topography. People, on the other hand, have a mind of their own and, in turn, an agenda. And while I believe this statement to be true in general, the sudden increase in wind speed and ensuing changes in both wind direction and fire spread reminds me my saying is flawed. Fires aren’t easy, especially when there isn’t solid knowledge of the influencing weather, or there is a lack of communication, or when one is inexperienced or tired, or both. This visit reminds me not to be flippant. Fighting fire is a dangerous occupation. 

   A plaque at the memorial reads, “In memory of the men from the New Tribes Mission and the United States Forest Service who gave their lives on July 9, 1953…” I guarantee none of those men “gave” their lives for a hillside covered in decadent chaparral. This is clear by how much ground they covered in challenging terrain, thick, nearly impenetrable fuels, in the dark, after swinging brush hooks and digging tools for hours. It is incumbent on me to do all I can to help today’s firefighters go home safely, despite the ever-increasing public and political pressure to put every fire out quickly, reminiscent of the old 10 a.m. policy. They don’t want to give their life, and neither politicians nor the public should push them to the point of tragedy.

Kurt La Rue, former Hotshot Superintendent and Bureau of Land Management NIFC Fire Operations Specialist – After Don’s excellent staff ride of the Rattlesnake Fire, I was once again impressed at the amount of line crews “back in the day” could construct with the equipment they had. In extremely harsh weather, fuel and terrain they got after it through the heat of the day in the best traditions of wildland firefighters. As they began to get operations on the remaining fireline sorted out, 24 of them moved in and secured what turned out to be an easily stopped spot fire.  Then in the cool night temps, out of the suns rays, their first meal of the day arrived and with their work finished they sat back and took a well-deserved break.  The lesson for me is: while the young brush and earth movers can and need to be able to rest and relax, even at times on the fireline, fireline leaders are never “done” with fireline operations until they have their crew parked in camp or at home.

Bill Molumby, former Hotshot Superintendent, US Fish & Wildlife Service Zone Fire Management Officer, and National Type 1 Incident Commander – The factors leading-up to this tragedy were not unusual, topography, fuels, weather, etc. The strategy and tactics seemed sound, albeit portable radios and spot weather forecasting/monitoring would have more than likely made a difference in the outcome. As a group, we tended to agree that we would have taken our crews to the spot fire, of course with a few caveats such as lookouts, escape routes and safety zones identified. The 1957 Task Force Report speaks to the things we now take for granted…

   I made a statement about the origin of the spot fire during our discussions which was contrary to the official investigation. In hindsight, I was ill-informed and a little arrogant. That realization led me to re-evaluate my view of staff ride sense-seeking. In my desire to find answers, I was willing to discount the official version in my search for truth. The quest for answers is influenced by our experiences, learning and perhaps ego. After re-reading the fire investigation report it was evident the investigation team wanted truth. They specifically documented what they believed to be the cause of the spot based on eyewitness accounts. Further, I saw Clive Countryman’s name as assisting with the investigation team. Any student of wildland fire knows that name and Mr. Countryman’s contribution to the study of wildland fire behavior. End of debate…

   This has also given me pause to consider the blame some have placed on Ewing by those looking for a scapegoat, given his past (Hauser Fire). I for one do not give that any credence.

   Finally, I think about the 14 New Tribes men, their faith and desire to serve…

Bryan Scholz, former Hotshot Foreman and District Assistant Fire Management Officer -  An old friend of ours is known for saying that "All history is remembered history."  For forty years the lives of the Mission boys had been forgotten. The lessons they had to teach us lay un-remembered. And then one day some Mendocino Hotshots decided that this could not stand, and in Hotshot fashion they picked up their tools and took action. Tho up in the hills far from town, no one now can drive that canyon and not know what happened there.  

   Remembering history is perhaps why I collect rocks.  So does Cook. I take a rock from a significant place on each staff ride. I have a rock from where the Four Horseman fell at Mann Gulch.  I have a piece of I - 70 asphalt from the bottom of the east drainage at South Canyon.  And I have a rock from the lunch spot at Rattlesnake.  Having those rocks on my shelf keeps me connected to these places and those spirits we visit. It keeps memories alive.  Keeping memories alive is part of the mission of OM&F, and I am honored to be a member.

Don Will, former Hotshot Superintendent and Forest Deputy Fire Chief - My takeaway is risk management. I often think if todays “Rules of Engagement” would have worked at Rattlesnake. It’s very easy to think this “wouldn’t happen to my crew” because of implementing a risk management process prior to attacking the spot fire, at night. But mitigating risk is only as good as the identification of hazards; which is the rationale behind the term Hazard/Risk Assessment. Without a continuous assessment of all hazards associated with the spot fire, a risk management plan may be incomplete. Hazards are not static. The wildland fire environment is very dynamic. Topography may be static, but fuels and weather are the dynamic factors, as is length of shift, crew conditioning, experience levels or what we know as “Human Factors.” Following a Hazard/Risk Assessment model, should it not be the “Eighteen and Ten?” After all the “Eighteen” are hazard identification and the “Ten” are mitigating the risk.

Tom Hatcher, former Hotshot Superintendent and US Forest Service North Operations Coordinator– Tom joined the group for the entire ride as a source of local knowledge.

Jon Tishner, former Hotshot Superintendent and Division Chief – Jon joined the group for part of the ride as a source of local knowledge.